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FDA PREEMPTION OF DRUG AND
DEVICE LABELING: WHO SHOULD
DECIDE WHAT GOES ON A DRUG
LABEL?
Tamsen Valoir, PhDt and Shubha Ghoshtt
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court decided an issue that is critical to consumer
health and safety last year. In April 2009, the Supreme Court held that
extensive FDA regulation of drugs did not preempt a state law claim
that an additional warning on the label was necessary to make the
drug reasonably safe for use. Thus, states-and even courts and ju-
ries-are now free to cast their vote on what a drug label should say.
This is in direct contrast to medical devices, where the federal statute
regulating medical devices expressly provides that state regulations
are preempted. This Article discusses basic preemption principles and
drugs, and explores the policy ramifications of pro- and anti-
preemption policy in the healthcare industry.
INTRODUCTION
In Wyeth v. Levine,' the Supreme Court held that state tort failure-
to-warn claims for pharmaceuticals are not preempted by federal la-
beling requirements, but, in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,2 the Court held
that regulatory approval of medical devices does preempt state tort
law on labeling and warnings. On the one hand, the result is easily
predicted since the statute governing medical devices has an express
t Tamsen Valoir is a partner in the Houston office of Boulware & Valoir.
She has a JD and LLM in Intellectual Property, a doctorate in molecular biology from
Rice University, and her practice is primarily in intellectual property in the life sci-
ences. Tamsen can be reached at tvaloir@boulwarevaloir.com.
tt Shubha Ghosh is a Professor of Law at The University of Wisconsin Law
School and Associate Director at INSITE. His scholarship and teaching are in the
areas of intellectual property theory and policy, competition policy, legal theory, and
institutional analysis of markets and legal institutions. Shubha can be reached at
ghosh7@wisc.edu.
1 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
2 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 321-330 (2008).
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preemption clause, whereas the statute relating to drugs does not.
However, given the similarity of the two types of medical products, it
is difficult to posit a rational basis for treating them differently.
Was Wyeth's outcome predicted by limited federal requirements,
while Riegel's is the result of a more extensive approval process for
medical devices? That distinction requires some metric for determin-
ing how extensive a regulatory process is, but at first blush, most prac-
titioners would agree that drug regulation is at least as extensive-if
not more so-than medical device regulation. Indeed, the regulatory
regimes are roughly analogous-at least for the riskiest Class III de-
vices.
If the differing regulatory regimes do not provide an answer, then
perhaps the nature of the state claim that was found preempted will
suggest a rationale. However, because similar state labeling laws-
failure to warn-and similar monetary remedies were at issue in each
case, the state claim does not offer much promise for explaining the
different outcomes. Thus, developing a useful analytic framework for
deciding which regulatory regime should be preempted poses a chal-
lenge.
This Article responds to this challenge by drawing on the frame-
work of comparative institutional analysis, a process that identifies
those who are in the best position to make a particular legal decision.
A simple example of comparative institutional analysis arises from the
question of whether to allow the judge or the jury to determine a par-
ticular issue. The line between judge and jury is drawn based upon
identifying certain questions as that of law and certain questions as
that of fact. More deeply, the judge/jury distinction rests on identify-
ing a legal issue as one requiring a stable, deductive answer to a ques-
tion (e.g., a legal question needing a legal answer) and one requiring a
particularized determination based on the specific record (e.g., a fac-
tual question needing an individual factual analysis). Other examples
of comparative institutional analysis are provided by constitutional
law with such doctrines as political question and standing. These legal
issues effectively depend on whether it is more desirable for a court,
or a legislature, to resolve a specific dispute. Comparative institutional
analysis thus addresses how to structure the answer to a legal problem
by looking to see who is in the best position to decide given differ-
ences in expertise as well as the social, political, and economic con-
straints that face the actors.
Comparative institutional analysis is particularly relevant to
preemption because the choice of decision maker is at the heart of the
question of whether state law is-or should be-trumped by federal
law. In the area of health and safety, the central question is whether an
administrative agency is in a better position to resolve a specific issue
556 [Vol. 21:555
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than a state court and its body of jurors. Drawing on the comparative
institutional analysis framework, we propose a simple and readily
applicable method for answering the question. If the issue involves
technical questions requiring scientific expertise and a careful balanc-
ing of competing interests, then federal law should preempt. However,
if there is a non-technical question raising issues of standard of care
and liability in an individual case, then there should not be preemp-
tion.
Based on this analysis, we suggest that litigation is not an appro-
priate venue for deciding what the package insert for a drug or medi-
cal device should say. In litigation, only the injured plaintiff is repre-
sented-no one represents the patients that benefit from a given medi-
cal product. Thus, there will always be a tendency towards false posi-
tives-a jury will usually be biased in favor of the injured plaintiff in
the court room, and the warnings on a package insert can become too
strong as a result. Further, over-warning is not merely a theoretical
concern-there now are examples where overly strong warnings have
deterred use of a medical product-and thus increased the overall
harm to the public. In contrast, the FDA, together with advisory com-
mittees and the manufacturer, crafts a label that reflects a balancing
of risks and benefits, and thus is a better mechanism for determining
label content.
At the same time, preemption would eliminate much litigation
against medical product companies. Historically, litigation has helped
to supplement the FDA's ability to gather information and has helped
to ensure that medical product companies act in compliance with the
law. However, Congress recently amended the law and medical prod-
uct companies are now required to publish all clinical trials and sum-
maries of adverse events, even for trials that are discontinued. There-
fore, as these changes are fully implemented, there will be less need to
supplement the FDA's information gathering with private litigation
because the FDA and the general public will be aware of adverse
events that led to discontinued trials.
The importance of litigation as a tool to ensure medical company
compliance with FDA regulations is also on the decline. Although
strongly criticized for under-enforcement, recent data indicates that
enforcement activities are increasing. Further, the ready availability
of the expanded clinical trial data to the general public will allow
watchdog groups to supplement agency enforcement activities via
citizen's petitions. Thus, many of the criticisms leveled against the
FDA are being addressed, indicating that the agency may be the better
mechanism for deciding the content of package inserts.
Given these facts and trends, the authors suggest that Congress
should consider providing an express preemption clause in the Food
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Drug and Cosmetic Act. This clause should be drafted to prevent fail-
ure-to-warn litigation regarding package inserts, but provide excep-
tions for the misrepresentation of data or delays in its presentation.
Thus, the careful balancing of risks and benefits will be placed back in
the hands of the medical experts at the FDA and its non-employee
Advisory Committees, but the threat of litigation will remain available
to deter misconduct.
This Article develops this policy argument for legislatively chang-
ing the Wyeth outcome. We emphasize from the outset that our con-
cem lies with "package inserts"-the detailed instructions for use of a
medical device or drug that is pre-approved by the FDA before the
drug or device can enter the market. The content of the package insert
reflects a careful balancing of product risks and benefits and contains
highly technical information to allow medical professionals to evalu-
ate the risks and benefits of each product before prescribing it to a
patient.3 As such, it is our proposal that the package insert should not
be subject to state-by-state jury decisions regarding content.
We are not, however, concerned herein with other types of con-
sumer communications, such as direct-to-consumer television or mag-
azine advertisements or web sites for specific products. Such adver-
tisements, while subject to FDA regulation,4 are not pre-approved
before deployment and do not reflect the same risk benefit balancing
efforts. Instead, such ads are highly simplified and serve to provide
consumers some information about a product, while referring them to
the package insert for complete information. Further, when a medical
product company bypasses the medical expert, omits safety infor-
mation and advertises directly to consumers, it incurs a greater risk of
misleading patients. Thus, direct-to-consumer advertising lies outside
the scope of our comparative institutional analysis.
Section One presents a general discussion of the goals of the
preemption doctrine and its doctrinal outline. Section Two describes
the regulatory framework for both drugs and medical devices. Sec-
tions Three and Four present discussions and analyses of the Riegel
and Wyeth cases. Section Five presents the broader discussion of who
Christine H. Kim, The Case for Preemption of Prescription Drug Failure-
to-Warn Claims, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 399, 405 (2007) ('The centerpiece of risk
management for prescription drugs' is its labeling . . . ." (citation omitted)).
4 See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2010). For information on the FDA's current
thinking on direct-to-consumer advertising, see FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY: PRESENTING RISK INFORMATION IN PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND MEDICAL
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should decide the salient issue in each of these cases. It is in Section
Five that we examine the ramifications of over-warning.
I. GENERAL PREEMPTION PRINCIPLES
In any system of law with different tiers of regulation, such as
country, state or municipality, there exist legal principles to ensure
that the various regulations do not conflict, and, where they do con-
flict, there are principles in place for resolving the inconsistency.
"Preemption" refers generally to the displacement of a lower jurisdic-
tion's laws when they conflict with those of a higher jurisdiction. In
the United States in particular, federal preemption refers to the dis-
placement of state law by federal law.
Our preemption doctrine stems directly from the Supremacy
Clause of the United States Constitution, which states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.5
Thus, the Supremacy Clause provides that federal laws are su-
preme over state laws and when the two directly conflict, the Consti-
tution dictates that federal law controls and the state law is unenforce-
able.6
However, the framers of the U.S. Constitution envisioned a politi-
cal system that avoided the concentration of power in a small number
of individuals. Thus, power is dispersed between the three branches of
the federal government and also between the state and federal gov-
ernments. Federal power is thus limited under our Constitution, and
the Tenth Amendment reflects a bias towards maintaining state pow-
ers to regulate: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people."'
5 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
6 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 129 (1824) ("In case of collision,
therefore, the State laws must yield to the superior authority of the United States.").
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (holding that the
Constitution ensures state legislative authority by delegating specific powers to the
federal government and limiting the exercise of federal legislative authority to these
delegated powers).
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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In keeping with this principle of limited federal powers, the courts
are guided by a presumption against preemption.9 This presumption
holds that the "historic police powers of the States [are] not to be su-
perseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."' 0 The presumption against preemption applies
with "particular force when Congress has legislated in a field tradi-
tionally occupied by the States,"" and this is particularly true in
health and safety, where the states have historically regulated. 12 Thus,
preemption is not the preferred choice, and if two laws can exist side-
by-side, they will each be allowed to stand.
In deciding preemption cases, the courts have long recognized
two types of preemption-express preemption and implied preemp-
tion. Express preemption "occurs when a federal statute includes a
preemption clause explicitly withdrawing specified powers from the
states."13 In enacting legislation Congress can expressly dictate that
9 California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490, 497 (1990) ("This interpretation would
accord with the 'presumption against finding pre-emption of state law in areas tradi-
tionally regulated by the States' and 'with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' (citations omitted)); Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (discussing the normal presumption against finding
preemption).
10 Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (quoting Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
1 Id.; Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (holding that the
preemption clause in the medical device statue did not preempt common law causes
of action for negligent design and labeling of a 501(k) medical device and stating "we
used a 'presumption against the pre-emption of state police power regulations' to
support a narrow interpretation of such an express command in Cipollone. That ap-
proach is consistent with both federalism concerns and the historic primacy of state
regulation of matters of health and safety." (citation omitted)); see also Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 54142 (2001) (applying the federal preemption
standard to advertising because advertising is a field of traditional state regulation).
But see Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 871 (2000) (not applying
a presumption or 'special burden' against preemption where there was both a preemp-
tion clause and a savings clause for common law liability because "Congress [would]
have wanted ordinary pre-emption principles to apply where an actual conflict with a
federal objective is at stake[.]").
12 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 475 ("Throughout our history the several States
have exercised their police powers to protect the health and safety of their citizens.
Because these are 'primarily, and historically . . . matter[s] of local concern,' the
'States traditionally have had great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to
the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons."' (citations
omitted)).
13 Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000); see also Jones
v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. at 532 (holding that the Federal Meat Inspection Act
(FMIA) preempted a California statute, used to evaluate the average weight or meas-
ure of any commodity, as applied to packed meat).
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state laws are preempted,14 and Congress often does so. However,
even where a federal law contains an express preemption clause, the
scope of the preemption and whether a state law lies within that scope
still must be determined, leading to considerable variation in the judi-
cial interpretations of a simple preemption clause.' 5 For example,
many statutes expressly preempt any state "requirements" that conflict
with the federal requirements. Most would agree that the word "re-
quirements" should apply to any contradictory state laws or regula-
tions, but there can be considerable disagreement as to whether com-
mon law tort causes of action are also preempted.16
Implied preemption may manifest itself in several ways. The Su-
preme Court has often found that Congress enacted a statute that was
"so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it."' 7 Similarly, the Supreme
14 English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
15 Altria Group, 129 S. Ct. at 543 ("If a federal law contains an express pre-
emption clause, it does not immediately end the inquiry because the question of the
substance and scope of Congress' displacement of state law still remains.").
16 E.g., Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485 (applying a presumption against preemp-
tion in deciding the scope of an express preemption clause in the area of health and
safety and holding that no preemption of common law tort claims exists for medical
devices that are not PMA approved and stating "'in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied,' we 'start with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress . . . Although dissenting Justices have argued that
this assumption should apply only to the question whether Congress intended any pre-
emption at all, as opposed to questions concerning the scope of its intended invalida-
tion of state law . .. That approach is consistent with both federalism concerns and
the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of health and safety."') (emphasis
added) (citations omitted); cf Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 545, 548
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("First, [the opinion] says that express pre-emption
provisions must be given the narrowest possible construction. This is in its view the
consequence of our oft repeated assumption that, absent convincing evidence of statu-
tory intent to pre-empt, 'the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be super-
seded,' But it seems to me that assumption dissolves once there is conclusive evi-
dence of intent to pre-empt in the express words of the statute itself, and the only
remaining question is what the scope of that pre-emption is meant to be" and conclud-
ing that where "the pre-emption provision was intended to sweep broadly, our con-
struction must sweep broadly as well." (citation omitted)); see also Geier, v. Ameri-
can Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. at 867-68, 870 (holding that the preemption clause
coupled with a saving clause that did not "exempt any person from any liability under
common law" allowed state tort claims, but holding that the claim action at issue
nonetheless provided an actual conflict with the law and was nevertheless preempted)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)).
" English, 496 U.S. at 79 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)); see Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566,
569 (1919) (striking down a Pennsylvania statute as being preempted by federal regu-
lations concerning the size and structure of mail cars located at the end of trains);
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Court has also found that when an act of Congress touches "a field in
which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will
be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same sub-
ject."18 This is generally known as "field preemption."
Implied preemption can also occur "[e]ven where Congress has
not entirely displaced state regulation in a specific area" to the extent
that the state regulation "actually conflicts" with federal law.' 9 Such
conflict may arise when "compliance with both federal and state regu-
lations is a physical impossibility" 20 or if compliance with state law
"stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." 21 This type of preemption is
typically referred to as "conflict preemption."
II. THE FOOD DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT
In order to understand preemption as applied to drugs and medical
devices, one must understand not only the general statutory scheme
for the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), but also the regulations
promulgated thereunder in some detail. We therefore begin with an
overview of the regulatory scheme and the essential details needed to
understand the preemption analysis that follows.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the oldest consumer
protection agency in the U.S. federal government, originating in the
Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 154 (1942) (holding that the entire
process of manufacture of renovated butter was subject to federal supervision, which
superseded any Alabama state regulations that applied).
18 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citing Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)) (holding that immigration and naturalization laws
are the exclusive province of Congress and preclude the enforcement of state alien
registration acts).
19 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-05 (1983) (holding that a California code addressing
storage capacity for a proposed nuclear powerplant's spent fuel does not conflict with
federal regulation of nuclear waste disposal).
20 Id. at 204 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 141, 142-43 (1963)); see, e.g., Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997) (hold-
ing that a Louisiana state law allowing a nonparticipant spouse to transfer by testa-
mentary instrument an interest in undistributed pension plan benefits is in direct con-
flict with ERISA and that compliance with both is an impossibility and that therefore
the state law is preempted); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (finding fed-
eral preemption where filing a schedule with the SEC about a tender offer pursuant to
the Williams Act would violate the Illinois Business Take-Over Act).
21 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (holding that a Massachusetts law,
which barred state entities from buying goods or services from providers linked with
Myanmar, frustrated a federal act that gave the President the flexibility to implement
the sanctions policy and was thus preempted).
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first decade of the Twentieth Century, albeit under a different name.
In 1906, Upton Sinclair published "The Jungle," a novel describing
the appalling conditions in Chicago's meat packing plants. An instant
bestseller, Sinclair's book reeked with the stink of the stockyards. He
told how dead rats were shoveled into sausage-grinding machines,
how bribed inspectors looked the other way when diseased cows were
slaughtered for beef, and how filth and guts were swept off the floor
and packaged as "potted ham." The book has some horrifying ex-
cerpts:
... as for the other men, who worked in tank rooms full of
steam, and in some of which there were open vats near the
level of the floor, their peculiar trouble was that they fell into
the vats; and when they were fished out, there was never
enough of them left to be worth exhibiting-sometimes they
would be overlooked for days, till all but the bones of them
had gone out to the world as Durham's Pure Leaf Lard!
Mr. Sinclair's intent in writing the novel was to expose the "infer-
no of exploitation" of the typical American factory worker at the turn
of the Twentieth Century, but the public instead fixated on food safety
and meat sales fell by half. Mr. Sinclair wryly noted the limited effect
of his book by stating, "I aimed at the public's heart, and by accident I
hit it in the stomach." 2 2
The (un)popular press generated from "The Jungle" gave Con-
gress the impetus to act. Thus, the original Food and Drug Act, also
known as the "Wiley Act," was passed in 1906. Although it was not
known by its present name until 1930, the FDA's modern regulatory
functions began with the passage of the Wiley Act, which prohibited
interstate commerce in "adulterated" or "misbranded" food and
drugs. 23
Three decades later, more than a hundred people, many of them
children, were killed by the "Elixir of Sulfanilamide"-an antibiotic
dissolved in the sweet but poisonous solvent diethylene glycol. 24 In
response, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
22 Upton Sinclair, What Life Means to Me, COSMOPOLITAN MAG., May-Oct.
1906, at 591, 594.
23 Wiley Act, ch. 3915, § 2, 34 Stat. 768, 768 (1906), repealed by 21 U.S.C.
§ 329(a) (1938).
24 See Deaths Following Elixir of Sulfanilamide-Massengill, 109 JAMA
1367, 1367 (1937); see also Carol Ballentine, Taste of Raspberries, Taste of Death:
The 1937 Elixir Sulfanilamide Incident, FDA CONSUMER, June 1981, at 18, 21.
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(FDCA) 25 was passed, and for the first time required a drug to be
proven "safe" before marketing.
The thalidomide tragedy sparked another expansion of FDA law.
Launched in 1957, thalidomide was proclaimed a "wonder drug" for
insomnia, coughs, colds and headaches. It was also found to inhibit
morning sickness, and ten of thousands of pregnant women took the
drug to relieve their nausea. Even though it had already been approved
in over twenty European and African countries, Dr. Frances Oldham
Kelsey withheld U.S. approval for the drug, requesting further studies
to explain an English study that documented a side effect in the nerv-
ous system. Dr. Kelsey's insistence that the drug should be fully test-
ed prior to approval was dramatically vindicated 2 6 when some
10,000-20,000 children in forty-six countries were born with limb
deformities as a direct result of the drug's use. Even though not ap-
proved in the U.S., more than a thousand Americans had ingested
unlabeled thalidomide tablets under the then unregulated clinical test-
ing.2 7 Partially in response to the thalidomide tragedy, 28 amendments
to the FDCA were passed in 1962 requiring drugs to be proven "effec-
tive" and safe before marketing, as well as requiring informed consent
for patients participating in clinical trials and the reporting of adverse
drug reactions.
Thus, by 1962, the FDA's core mandate was formulated: to en-
sure that drugs are (i) safe, (ii) effective, (iii) unadulterated, and (iv)
not misbranded. Of course, there have been many amendments to the
FDCA not elaborated herein, but the reader can nonetheless appreciate
based on this abbreviated history that FDA powers and responsibili-
ties have only increased since its inception.
25 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et. seq.).
26 Dr. Kelsey was awarded the President's Award for Distinguished Federal
Civilian Service by President John F. Kennedy for her actions. S. Vincent Rajkumar,
Thalidomide: Tragic Past and Promising Future, 79 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 899, 899
(2004).
27 John Mulliken, A Woman Doctor Who Would Not Be, LIFE, Aug. 10, 1962,
at 28 ("As part of the application procedure, [the manufacturer] had already sent the
drug out to American doctors-the number eventually reached 1200-for testing.
This was standard drug firm procedure, permitted by the law ... ),
28 Numbers vary, but only seventeen to forty American babies were born
deformed due to inadequate regulations. Sarah Richardson, Helping the Medicine Go
Down, NEWSDAY (NEW YORK), Apr. 6, 2003, at D35 ("Because of Kelsey's caution,
the estimated cases of affected American babies numbered about 40, while some
8,000 or more cases occurred in Europe."); The Return of Thalidomide, WASH. TIMES,
July 25, 1998, at C2 ("Since the FDA kept the drug from U.S. approval, not many
American women had access to it, and there were only about two dozen American
thalidomide babies.").
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Our preemption analysis will focus largely on the "misbranding"
aspects of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act-whereby the FDA en-
sures that the drug is correctly labeled and that all advertising relating
to a drug is also correct. 29 A drug is misbranded if, among other
things, the drug's "labeling is false or misleading in any particular," or
if the labeling does not provide "adequate directions for use" or "ade-
quate warnings." 30 A drug that "is dangerous to health when used in
the dosage or manner, or with the frequency or duration prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the labeling thereof' does not comply
with FDA regulations.31
Under the FDCA, a drug manufacturer may not market a new
drug unless it has submitted a new drug application (NDA) to the
FDA and received FDA approval.32 In addition to showing that the
drug is safe and effective, as well as correctly manufactured (not adul-
terated), the drug application must contain "the labeling proposed to
be used for such drug" 33 -ln other words, the drug must not be mis-
branded. Also required is "a discussion of why the benefits exceed the
risks [of the drug] under the conditions stated in the labeling."34 Thus,
unlike many other consumer products, the labeling of a medical prod-
uct is the guidepost by which both safety and effectiveness are evalu-
ated. In other words, can the medical product be considered reason-
ably safe and effective under the conditions of use prescribed in the
"label"?
The FDA will approve a new drug application if it finds, among
other things, that (i) the drug is "safe for use under the conditions pre-
scribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof";
(ii) there is "substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it
purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use pre-
scribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling thereof';
and (iii) the proposed labeling is not "false or misleading in any par-
ticular."36
Even after a drug has been approved and enters the market, the
manufacturer must investigate and report to the FDA any adverse
29 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)-(b) (2006).
30 21 U.S.C. § 352(a), (0.
' 21 U.S.C. § 352(a), (0, (j).
32 21 U.S.C. § 355 (applying this provision to new drugs, but many drugs
were grandfathered in since they were already on the market when these amendments
were passed).
' 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(c)(2)(i), (e)(2)(ii) (2010).
34 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(viii); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(c)(2)(ix).
3 Kim, supra note 3, at 405 ('The centerpiece of risk management for pre-
scription drugs' is its labeling . . . .") (cite omitted).
36 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
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events associated with use of the drug in humans, 3 7 and must periodi-
cally submit any new information that may affect the FDA's previous
conclusions about the safety, effectiveness, or labeling of the drug.38
The FDA "shall" withdraw its approval of an application if it finds,
among other things, that the drug is not safe or effective under the
conditions of use specified in the drug's labeling. 3
Once approved, the manufacturer generally may not make chang-
es to the drug, including "[c]hanges in labeling," without first submit-
ting a supplemental application to the FDA and securing the agency's
prior approval for the change. 4 0 A manufacturer must submit such a
supplemental application "to include a warning about a clinically sig-
nificant hazard as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal
association with a drug," 41 although "[a]n applicant may ask FDA to
expedite its review of a supplement for public health reasons."42
Critical to an understanding of the Supreme Court's preemption
analysis in the drug context is the FDA's so-called "changes being
effected" or "CBE" regulation at 21 C.F.R. §314.70(c). On its face,
this regulation seems to allow drug manufacturers to strengthen safety
language without prior FDA approval, as long as the manufacturer
simultaneously informs the FDA of the change. The regulation reads
in relevant part:
... An applicant shall submit a supplement at the time the ap-
plicant makes any kind of change listed below in the condi-
tions in an approved application . . . Changes labeling to ac-
complish any of the following: (i) To add or strengthen a
contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction
(emphasis added) ...
Thus, on its face, 21 C.F.R. §314.70(c) allows the manufacture to
add or strengthen a warning without prior approval by the FDA. Alt-
hough quite permissive on its face, the FDA in practice does not al-
low label changes without prior approval except in cases of emergen-
cy and pharmaceutical companies rarely, if ever, invoke it. Instead,
the FDA interprets the CBE regulation to permit changes without pri-
3 21 C.F.R. § 314.80.
38 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(k) (describing post-approval reporting and record-
keeping requirements); 21 C.F.R. § 314.81.
3 21 U.S.C. § 355(e).
40 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(1)-(2).
41 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6).
42 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(4).
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or approval only to address "newly discovered risks." 4 3 The FDA em-
phasized this point in the final rule approval, stating:
. . . CBE supplements were intended as a narrow exception
to the general rule that labeling changes require FDA's prior
approval:
Drug labeling serves as the standard under which
FDA determines whether a product is safe and effec-
tive. Substantive changes in labeling * * * are more
likely than other changes to affect the agency's previ-
ous conclusions about the safety and effectiveness of
the drug. Thus, they are appropriately approved by
FDA in advance, unless they relate to important
safety information, like a new contraindication or
warning, that should be immediately conveyed to
the user.
Initially, the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act did not apply to medi-
cal devices-but then came the Dalkon Shield. The Dalkon Shield,
introduced in 1970, was a plastic intrauterine device that looked like a
round bug with one large eye, five legs on each side, and a tail. The
device was inserted into the uterus to prevent pregnancy, and the tail
hung out of the cervix for easy removal of the device. According to
one theory, the tail was composed of multiple fibers and thus "wick-
ed" materials from the vaginal environment into the normal sterile
environment of the uterus by capillary action, causing infection and
resulting complications.45
By the spring of 1974, the manufacturer had received hundreds of
complaints and the device was voluntarily removed from the market.
The Dalkon Shield was eventually linked to several deaths, thousands
of infections, and allowed a higher rate of pregnancies than other
4' 47 Fed. Reg. 46,622, 46,623, 46,635 (Oct. 19, 1982).
4 73 Fed. Reg. 2850 (Jan. 16, 2008) (quoting 50 Fed. Reg. 7470 (Feb. 22,
1985)) (emphasis added).
45 Howard J. Tatum et al., Morphological Studies of Dalkon Shield Tails
Removed from Patients, 11 CONTRACEPTION 465, 465-77 (1975) ("Examination of the
tails of Dalkon Shields removed from patients showed that approximately 34% of the
tails had breaks or holes in the nylon sheath immediately below the double knot at the
base of the Shield. . . . Bacteria were found within the interfilamental spaces inside
the sheath of 8 of the 10 tails. These observations suggest that bacteria which have
ascended through the tail from the vagina could exit through these breaks in the
sheath or from the terminal end of the tail directly into the endometrial cavity.").
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IUDs, many of which were complicated.46 Over time, more than
300,000 complaints were filed against the company for its manufac-
ture and sale of the Dalkon Shield.47
Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the
FDCA in 1976, largely in response to the Dalkon Shield debacle, and
48thereby extended the premarket approval process to medical devices.
Since the term "medical devices" covers a broad scope of devices-
ranging from bandages to pacemakers-the MDA regulates medical
devices according to the risks the device presents to its user. Thus,
medical devices are categorized into three classes.
Class I devices, such as tongue depressors, are generally subject
only to minimal controls by the FDA because of their generally ac-
cepted safety.4 9 Class II devices, such as tampons, are subject to more
specialized controls that may include performance standards or specif-
ic guidelines for each type of device.o Many (but not all) Class II
devices are also subject to an abbreviated clearance process known as
the premarket notification or 510(k) process. In the 510(K) applica-
tion, all that needs to be shown is "substantial equivalence" to a predi-
cate device already on the market. Thus, the 501(k) is somewhat anal-
ogous to the abbreviated new drug application for generic drugs. Class
III devices-such as pacemakers-are the riskiest devices and must
undergo a stringent premarket approval (PMA) process because of the
central role they play in saving lives.5' The PMA process requires
clinical testing to show safety and effectiveness, manufacturing details
and proposed labeling, and is analogous to the new drug application,
albeit differing in some details.52 Important to understanding medical
device regulation is the fact that devices were grandfathered into the
system if they were already on the market. Thus, many devices that
might appear as though they should be subject to premarket approval
are nonetheless cleared under the lenient 501(k) process, if that device
or predicate devices were already on the market at the time the MDA
was enacted. Thus, the classification system only roughly correlates
46 Jacques-E. Rioux et al., Long-term Study of the Safety of the Dalkon Shield
and Gyne-T 200 Intrauterine Devices, 134 CAN. MED. Ass'N J. 747, 747 (1986)
(comparing two IUDs and noting that the rate of accidental pregnancy per 100 women
were 3.8 for the Dalkon Shield users and I for another ID, although rates of pelvic
inflammatory disease, pregnancy outcomes, and infertility rates were similar).
47 Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost
(Or Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617, 628 (1992).
48 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360e (2006).
49 See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
so See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
5' See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
52 21 U.S.C. §360e; 21 C.F.R. § 814 (2010).
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with the PMA process, and many Class III devices are only 510(k)
cleared.
When the MDA was enacted in 1976 some states had already
promulgated statutes designed to bridge the regulatory gap for medi-
cal devices.53 Therefore, the MDA also provided an express preemp-
tion clause:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or
continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human
use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or
to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the
device under this chapter.54
Thus, unlike the rest of the FDCA, preemption is expressly pro-
vided for medical device law and regulations only.
III. PREEMPTION AND MEDICAL DEVICES
The most recent Supreme Court case dealing with preemption and
the FDA's regulation of medical devices was Riegel v. Medtronic,55 in
which the Court addressed the preemption provisions of the MDA.
The device at issue in Riegel was a balloon catheter. 56 Balloon cathe-
ters are designed to be inserted into a blocked artery and inflated in
order to clear the blockage. The catheter was contraindicated for
patients with diffuse or calcified stenoses, because those arteries may
be insufficiently flexible for the procedure and might rupture on infla-
tion of the balloon.58 Further, the device's "label also warned that the
catheter itself should not be inflated beyond its rated burst pressure of
eight atmospheres."59
In spite of the label, Riegel's doctor employed the balloon cathe-
ter in a coronary artery that was heavily calcified.60 Additionally, the
E.g., 1970 Cal. Stats. ch. 1573, §§ 26670-26693.
54 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006).
5s Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 315 (2008).
56 Riegel, 551 U.S. at 320.
57 THE MERCK MANUAL OF HEALTH & AGING 672 (Mark H. Beers et al. eds.,
mass market ed. 2006).





doctor inflated the catheter to a pressure of 10 atmospheres.6 1 Not
surprisingly, the catheter ruptured, Mr. Riegel developed a heart block
62
and underwent emergency coronary bypass surgery.
The Riegels claimed the device was negligently designed, labeled,
and manufactured in a manner that violated New York common law
and that the defects led to severe and permanent injuries.63 Thus, the
Complaint contained a number of common law claims including strict
liability, negligence, breach of implied warranty and loss of consorti-
um.
The catheter was a Class III device and was subject to premarket
approval before use.6 ' Therefore, the federal district court held that
the MDA preempted all of the Riegels' state claims, including the loss
of consortium claim, because it was a derivative of the preempted
state claim.66 This decision was affirmed by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the basis that if the Riegels'
claims were successful, they would impose state requirements that
differed from the federal requirements imposed during the rigorous
67premarket approval process.
In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court stated that since the
MDA expressly preempts state requirements that differ from federal
requirements, it must answer two questions. First, it must first deter-
mine whether the government has established requirements for the
catheter.68 If so, then the second question is whether the common-law
claims are based upon New York requirements that differ from or are
in addition to the federal requirements.6 9
With respect to the first question, the Court held that because
Medtronic's catheter received premarket approval, the device could
not be made with any deviation from the premarket approval applica-
tion and thus the federal government had established specific re-




6 Id at 320-21.
65 Id. at 320.
66 Id. at 320-21.
67 Id. at 321.
68 Id.
69 Id. 321-22.
70 Id. at 323. "Premarket approval is a 'rigorous' process." The FDA grants
premarket approval only if it finds there is a "reasonable assurance" of the device's
"safety and effectiveness." Id. at 317-18 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d) (2006)); cf
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 471 (1996) (holding that preemption does not
apply to devices only subject to a "substantial equivalence" analysis (e.g., 501(k)
premarket notification) because such clearance did not include review of safety and
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Turning to the second question, the Court held that references to
State "requirements" clearly encompassed its common law duties and
that the State requirements were in fact different from the device-
specific federal requirements.7 As a result, the Court affirmed the
Second Circuit's ruling holding that Medtronic was subject only to the
device-specific requirement of adhering to the standards contained in
its individual, federally approved premarket approval application, and
that any further state requirements that required the device to be saf-
er-but possibly less effective-were preempted.72
This decision was by an eight to one margin, with only Justice
Ginsburg dissenting, making it highly unlikely that the Court will
overrule its decision anytime in the near future. Thus, preemption of
state failure-to-warn cases is the rule for those medical devices that-
like drugs-are subject to premarket approval. Cases relating to de-
vices that are only cleared under the 510(k) process are not preempt-
ed,13 but we focus herein on the riskiest medical devices that are sub-
ject to same type of premarket approval process that drugs and biolog-
ics are subject to.
IV. PREEMPTION LAW AS IT APPLIES TO DRUGS
In contrast to medical devices, federal preemption is not the rule
in pharmaceutical cases. The issue came to the Supreme Court
cloaked in tragedy. Diana Levine-a bass, guitar and piano player and
author of children's music in Vermont-visited a clinic to receive
treatment for severe headache-related nausea, but wound up losing her
arm to gangrene and is now unable to play any musical instrument.
A physician's assistant (PA) attending to Ms. Levine administered
Phenergan using a delivery technique known as an "IV push," inad-
vertently injecting the drug into one of Ms. Levine's arteries in the
process, severely damaging the tissue and causing gangrene. Not sur-
prisingly, Ms. Levine sued the clinic and the PA for malpractice and
received a $700,000 settlement. But Ms. Levine also sued the manu-
facturer-Wyeth-alleging that the warning labels were insufficient.
effectiveness). The device at issue in the Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr case-a pacemak-
er-was a significant risk class III device, but it was grandfathered in under the
501(k) exception because it was a substantial equivalent to a pacemaker already on
the market when the MDA was enacted. Thus, the FDA never reviewed the safety and
efficacy of that device.
7' Riegel, 552 U.S. at 323-24.
72 Id. at 325, 329-30.
73 Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 471-72 (holding that the preemption clause in the
medical device statue did not preempt common law causes of action for negligent
design and labeling of a 501(k) medical device).
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The drug at issue-Phenergan@-is also known as promethazine
and is an antihistamine used to treat allergy symptoms. Phenergan@
also prevents motion sickness, and treats nausea and vomiting or pain
after surgery, and can be used as a sedative or sleep aid. However,
Phenergan@-like all drugs-has unwanted side effects, including the
ability to cause gangrene when incorrectly injected into an artery. In
fact, it has been known for decades that Phenergan@ can cause gan-
grene when injected intra-arterially,7 4 and the package insert specifi-
cally contraindicated intra-arterial injection:
CONTRAINDICATIONS
Under no circumstances should PHENERGAN Injection be
given by intra-arterial injection due to the likelihood of severe
arteriospasm and the possibility of resultant gangrene (see
WARNINGS-Severe Tissue Injury, Including Gangrene).
The insert warned that all injection sites could cause severe reac-
tions:
Injection Site Reactions
PHENERGAN Injection can cause severe chemical irritation
and damage to tissues, regardless of the route of administra-
tion. Irritation and damage can also result from perivascular
extravasation, unintentional intra-arterial injection, and in-
traneuronal or perineuronal infiltration.7 6
The insert went on to state that the symptoms of damage include
pain and burning, and that gangrene and amputation could result:
74 B.S. Goldman et al., The Recognition And Management Of Peripheral
Arterial Injuries, 92 J. CAN. MED. Ass'N 1154, 1156 (1965) ("[A] 42-year-old man[]
inadvertently received an injection of promethazine into the radial artery . . . [and]
amputation of all or part of each digit was required because of gangrene.").
7 See Phenergan Package Insert (on file with author); see also NATIONAL




for Healthcare Professionals-Intravenous Promethazine and Severe Tissue Injury,
Including Gangrene, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 16, 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetylnformationforPatientsa
ndProviders/DrugSafetylnformationforHeathcareProfessionals/ucml82169.htm;
Phenergan Injection Official FDA Information, Side Effects and Uses, DRUGS.COM,
http://www.drugs.com/pro/phenergan-injection.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2011).
76 See supra note 75.
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Signs, symptoms, and manifestations of severe tissue irrita-
tion include burning, pain, erythema, swelling, severe spasm
of distal vessels, thrombophlebitis, venous thrombosis, phle-
bitis, abscesses, tissue necrosis, and gangrene. Administration
of PHENERGAN Injection has resulted in nerve damage
ranging from temporary sensory loss to palsies and paralysis.
Injection into or near a nerve may result in permanent tissue
damage. In some cases, surgical intervention (including fasci-
otomy, skin graft, and/or amputation) may be required (see
ADVERSE REACTIONS). 77
The insert also warned specifically against inadvertent intra-
arterial injections, which are known to happen on intravenous (IV)
administration, and can result in gangrene and amputation:
Inadvertent Intra-Arterial Injection
Due to the close proximity of arteries and veins in the areas
most commonly used for intravenous injection, extreme care
should be exercised to avoid perivascular extravasation or un-
intentional intra-arterial injection. Reports compatible with
unintentional intra-arterial injection of PHENERGAN Injec-
tion, usually in conjunction with other drugs intended for in-
travenous use, suggest that pain, severe chemical irritation,
severe spasm of distal vessels, and resultant gangrene requir-
ing amputation are likely under such circumstances. Intrave-
nous injection was intended in all the cases reported but peri-
vascular extravasation or arterial placement of the needle is
now suspect. There is no proven successful management of
unintentional intra-arterial injection or perivascular extravasa-
tion after it occurs. Sympathetic block and heparinization
have been employed during the acute management of uninten-
tional intra-arterial injection, because of the results of animal
experiments with other known arteriolar irritants. Aspiration
of dark blood does not preclude intra-arterial needle place-
ment, because blood is discolored upon contact with
PHENERGAN Injection. Use of syringes with rigid plungers
77 Id
Douglas Goldsmith & Norman Trieger, Accidental Intra-Arterial Injec-
tion: A Medical Emergency, 22 ANESTHESIA PROGRESS 180, 180 (1975) ("One of the
potentially serious complications of administering intravenous medication is the inad-
vertent injection into an artery.").
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or of small-bore needles might obscure typical arterial back-
flow if this is relied upon alone.7 9
Further, the insert specifically stated that the dosage rate should
not exceed 25 mg per minute, and again stated that the preferred route
was by intravenous infusion, also known as IV drip:
When used intravenously, PHENERGAN Injection should be
given in a concentration no greater than 25 mng per mL and at
a rate not to exceed 25 mg per minute. When administering
any irritant drug intravenously, it is usually preferable to in-
ject it through the tubing of an intravenous infusion set that is
known to be functioning satisfactorily.80
It also warned that the injection should be stopped immediately if
the patent reported pain during intravenous injection:
In the event that a patient complains of pain during intended
intravenous injection of PHENERGAN Injection, the injec-
tion should be stopped immediately to provide for evaluation
of possible arterial placement or perivascular extravasation. 81
Phenergan was first approved by the FDA in 1951 and was later
approved for intravenous use, during which time the FDA and Wyeth
discussed IV push as one means of administering Phenergan. 82 Intra-
venous therapy or "IV" therapy is the giving of liquid substances di-
rectly into a vein. An intravenous drip is the continuous infusion of
fluids, with or without additional medications, through an IV access
device. 84 In IV push, a syringe is connected to the IV access device
and the medication is injected directly into the vein over a few
minutes." In contrast, in IV drip the drug is usually diluted into other
fluids and dripped slowly into the patient's vein over a longer period
of time.86
7 See supra note 75.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Details for Phenergan (NDA # 008857) are no longer available at the
Drugs@FDA website and the drug has been discontinued (see
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/drugsatfda/). Thus, the information pro-
vided here was obtained from the dissenting opinion in Wyeth. Wyeth v. Levine, 129
S. Ct. 187, 1222 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
83 See THE BANTAM MEDICAL DICTIONARY 375 (6th ed. 2009).
84 See id. at 219.
85 SHARON M. WEINSTEIN, PLUMER'S PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
INTRAVENOUS THERAPY 479 (8th ed. 2007).
86 NANCY BRUNING, COPING WITH CHEMOTHERAPY 109 (rev. ed. 2002).
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In August of 1975, representatives from both Wyeth and the FDA
met to discuss Phenergan's warning label. At that meeting, the FDA
specifically proposed that Phenergan Injection should not be used in
Tubex@-a syringe system designed for IV push. " The agency's
concerns arose from "5 cases involving amputation where the drug
had been administered by Tubex together with several additional cas-
es involving necrosis." 89 Rather than contraindicating Phenergan for
IV push, however, the parties agreed "that there was a need for better
instruction regarding the problems of intra-arterial injection." 90
A year later, a FDA advisory committee recommended an addi-
tional IV-push-specific warning for Phenergan's label, but did not
recommend eliminating IV push from the drug label altogether. 9 1
Thereon, the FDA instructed Wyeth to make several changes to
strengthen Phenergan's label, including the addition of upper case
warnings related to IV push. 9 2
In 1987, the FDA directed Wyeth to again amend its label to di-
rect that the drug "should be given in a concentration no greater than
25 mg/ml and at a rate not to exceed 25 mg/minute," and that
"[i]njection through a properly running intravenous infusion may en-
hance the possibility of detecting arterial placement." 93
In its 1987 labeling order, the FDA provided voluminous materi-
als to support its stronger warnings against PV push and preference for
P1 drip, including published case reports from the 1960s of gangrene
caused by the intra-arterial injection of Phenergan and numerous cau-
tionary articles-one of which urged the agency to consider contrain-
dicating such drugs for IV use altogether. 94
Thus, the FDA was not ignorant of the risk of gangrene with IV
push. In fact, many drugs are known to cause severe injury on acci-
dental intra-arterial injection, 9 5 but IV push remains a valuable treat-
ment option for certain patients.96 Presumably in view of the potential
advantages in quick response time, cost and time savings, decreased






93 Id. at 1123.
94 Id. at 1123-24.
9s See Goldsmith & Trieger, supra note 78, at 180 ("Any drug given intra-
arterially should be considered toxic.").
96 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1231 (Alito, J., dissenting). The appendix to the dis-
sent lists several drugs for which IV push is allowed, even where such drugs are very
toxic when accidentally injected into the artery.
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fluid load, and increased nurse monitoring throughout the shorter IV
push procedure, 9 7 the FDA declined to prohibit the method altogeth-
er.
The actual record regarding the FDA thought processes, however,
is practically non-existent.99 Instead, the FDA record merely provides
that the 1997 label should be the same as to the prior label.' 00 The
label changes proposed by Wyeth did not address prohibiting IV push,
but merely rewording the current warnings.' 0 ' Thus, the court found
as a factual matter that the record was insufficient to establish that the
FDA considered and rejected an IV push contraindication.'02 The fact
remains, however, that the risk of gangrene and amputation was
known by the FDA at the time of approval and at each time thereafter
that the labels were revised. However, the FDA repeatedly declined to
contraindicate IV push use of the drug.
' Richard Rosenfeld, Clinical and Economical Considerations for IV Push
Drug Delivery: An Overview of the Historical Background for IV Push and a Model
for Implementation of a Successful Program 3-4, (2007),
http://www.baxa.com/resources/docs/technicalPapers/VPushTechPaper.pdf (discuss-
ing IV push versus IV piggyback and noting several advantages of IV push, including
decreased time for administration where the nurse remains on hand to monitor pa-
tients' reactions to the drug, improved clinical outcomes since nurses can spend the
one to two minutes of administration talking to patients, increased patient compliance
due to the shorter time constraints, and decreased fluid load for fluid-restricted pa-
tients); James C. Garrelts et al., Postinfusion Phlebitis After Intravenous Push Versus
Intravenous Piggyback Administration of Antimicrobial Agents, 7 CLINICAL
PHARMACY 760, 760 (1988) ("The fact that the catheter sites lasted significantly long-
er in the i.v. push group, combined with elimination of the cost of syringe infusion
pumps or i.v. tubing and minibags, suggests that use of the i.v. push method may
result in substantial cost savings.").
98 The FDA does not regulate the practice of medicine, and would only "con-
traindicate" a usage, not "prohibit" it. However, contraindicating a use has a strong
deterrent effect on physician practice since prescribing a use in spite of a contrainda-
tion can result in liability in the event harm ensues.
' Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1192.
10 Brief for Petitioner at 16, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No.
06-1249) (instructing Wyeth to .' [rIetain verbiage in current label' concerning inad-
vertent intra-arterial injection, thus rejecting the previously proposed changes").
1o' Wyeth v. Levine, 944 A.2d 179, 189 (Vt. 2006) ("With respect to IV ad-
ministration, the original label read, 'When administering any irritant drug intrave-
nously it is usually preferable to inject it through the tubing of an intravenous infusion
set that is known to be functioning satisfactorily,' while the proposed label stated,
'[i]njection through a properly running intravenous infusion may enhance the possi-
bility of detecting arterial placement. In addition, this results in delivery of a lower
concentration of any arteriolar irritant.' Simply stated, the proposed warning was
different, but not stronger. It was also no longer or more prominent than the original
warning, so it could not have raised a concern that it might overshadow other warn-
ings on the label or drive doctors away from prescribing the drug.").
102 Id.; see also Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199 n.5-6, 1200.
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Unaware of the risks emphasized several times in Phenergan's
package insert, the physician's assistant pushed a double dose of the
drug into Ms. Levine's artery over the course of a few minutes, not-
withstanding Ms. Levine's complaints of a burning sensation that she
subsequently described as "one of the most extreme pains that I've
ever felt."10 3 Sometime thereafter, Ms. Levine's fingers turned black
and her hand-and eventually the entire arm below the elbow-were
amputated to treat the resulting gangrene. 0"
Following a settlement with the health facility and the medical
practitioner, Ms. Levine brought common-law negligence and strict
liability claims against Wyeth, claiming that Phenergan's labeling was
defective because it failed to instruct clinicians to use the IV drip
method as opposed to the IV push method.10 5 In response, Wyeth ar-
gued that Ms. Levine's state claims were impliedly preempted by fed-
eral law in two ways.106 First, it would have been impossible for Wy-
eth to comply with state law without violating the federal labeling
requirements, and secondly, state liability for use of an FDA-approved
label would present an obstacle to the federal objectives of the Con-
gress.107
The court told the jury that they could consider the FDA's ap-
proval of the label in deciding whether Wyeth was negligent, but that
the label's compliance with FDA rules did not establish the adequacy
of the warnings therein.108 At the conclusion of the trial in 2005, the
jury found in favor of Ms. Levine and awarded her $7.4 million in
damages on both negligence and product liability claims. 109
Wyeth appealed and in October 2006 the Vermont Supreme Court
affirmed and held that the jury's verdict did not conflict with the
FDA's labeling requirements because Wyeth could have warned
against the IV-push method without obtaining pre-approval from the
FDA under the agency's changes being effected or "CBE" rule. 110
Further, because the FDA rules create only minimum labeling re-
103 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1226 (Alito, J., dissenting).
'04 Id. at 1191.
"os Id. at 1191-92.
106 Id. at 1193. There were additional arguments, including that the physician
assistant's actions were an intervening cause, reliving Wyeth of liability, but we focus
herein on preemption, not tort liability or other issues. Id. ("the jury found that Wyeth
was negligent, that Phenergan was a defective product as a result of inadequate warn-
ings and instructions, and that no intervening cause had broken the causal connection
between the product defects and the plaintiff's injury.") (citations omitted).
107 Id.
10 Wyeth v. Levine, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 187.
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quirements, state tort liability for approved labels would not frustrate
Congress's objectives when it enacted the FDCA."' The jury verdict
established only that Phenergan's warning was insufficient.,1 2 It did
not mandate a particular replacement warning, nor did it require con-
traindicating IV-push administration.1 1 3 Thus, concluded the Vermont
Supreme Court, "[t]here may have been any number of ways for [Wy-
eth] to strengthen the Phenergan warning without completely elimi-
nating IV-push administration." 1 4
Wyeth then petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari, which
was granted. Wyeth first contended that the Vermont Supreme Court
had misinterpreted the scope of an FDCA provision allowing manu-
facturers to modify product labels without FDA approval, suggesting
that the provision only allowed changes when new risks had been
discovered. Specifically, Wyeth contended that the CBE was not im-
plicated because of a 2008 amendment that provided that a manufac-
turer may only change its label to reflect "newly acquired infor-
mation."" 5 Because, as Wyeth argued, there existed no newly ac-
quired information, it was impossible for it to provide a stronger la-
bel. 116 Further, to unilaterally add a new warning, it would have vio-
lated a federal law governing misbranding. 1 7
The Court, however, held that "newly acquired information" was
not limited to new data, but also encompassed "new analyses of pre-
viously submitted data.""' Although the record of new evidence was
limited, Ms. Levine produced some evidence indicating that there
were at least twenty incidents prior to hers where Phenergan caused
gangrene and amputations. 119 Thus, the Court concluded that once
these incidents were brought to Wyeth's attention, it could have
worked with the FDA to change the warning label.12 0 Further,
strengthening the warning label would not have violated federal law.
The FDCA does not state that a drug is misbranded simply because it
has been altered.' 2 ' Rather the misbranded provision applies only to
...Id. at 190.
.12 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1193.
' Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 189.
114 id.
115 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196 (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. 49,609 (Aug.
22,2008)).
116 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196.
" Id. at 1197.
118 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1196 (2009) (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. 49,604
(Aug. 22, 2008)).
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labels that do not provide "adequate warnings."1 2 2 Thus, strengthening
the warning label is permitted.
Wyeth also argued that Ms. Levine's claims were "preempted be-
cause they interfere with "Congress's purpose to entrust an expert
agency to make drug labeling decisions that strike a balance between
competing objectives." 23 Specifically, in determining whether a drug
is safe, Wyeth argued that the FDA conducted a risk-benefit assess-
ment in establishing a labeling standard that left no room for different
state-law judgments. 124 As a result, when the agency approved Phen-
ergan's label, it knew that IV push administration carried risks that
could result in gangrene, but it decided that the benefits of allowing its
continued use via IV push outweighed those risks. Thus, according to
Wyeth, this agency expert determination represented a "ceiling" level
of safety whereby a state-law jury verdict could not further raise the
standard. 125
The Court, however, held that had Congress believed that state-
law suits posed an obstacle to the FDA's mission, it would have en-
acted an express pre-emption provision at some point during the sev-
enty-year existence of the FDCA. 12 6 Instead, the court held that the
FDA standards represented a floor, not a ceiling, and that warnings
could therefore be increased.12 7 In addition, it appeared that Congress
had always looked upon state law as complimentary to drug regula-
tion, given the fact that the FDA has limited resources to monitor the
thousands of drugs that are on the market at any given time.128 Further
state-law suits uncover previously unknown dangers and provide in-
centives for drug manufacturer to examine the risks and to disclose
those risks quickly.129
Ultimately, the Court ruled that since Congress repeatedly de-
clined to preempt state law, and it was possible for Wyeth to comply
with both state and federal obligations, there was no obstacle to the
accomplishment of Congress' purposes in the FDCA. 3 0 Further, pub-
lic policy mandated that drug companies should be responsible for
122 Id. (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 352(f) (2006)).
123 Id at 1199 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 46, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct.
1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249)).
124 Brief for Petitioner at 46, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No.
06-1249).
121 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199.
126 Id. at 1200.
127 Id. at 1200-02.
128 Id. at 1202.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 1204.
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keeping their warning labels current and complete, not the FDA.
Thus, there is no preemption of failure-to-warn cases for pharmaceuti-
cal products.
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF FDA PREEMPTION
The ultimate effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth v.
Levine is that state courts and juries now have a say (if not the final
say) on the adequacy of the warnings in pharmaceutical package in-
serts. We wonder whether this is a good result and what the ramifica-
tions of this decision will be.
One real-world consequence is that in September 2009, the FDA
finally moved the warnings about the serious risks of arterial injection
to the so called "black box"-making the warnings more promi-
nent. 132 However, the FDA still declines to prohibit IV push as sug-
gested by Ms. Levine.133 The black box language has not been final-
ized as of the writing of this Article, but will appear at the top of the
package insert inside a black box, in bold font and capital letters,
alongside the existing black box warnings regarding use in pediatric
patients.
Another real world consequence is that Phenergan has been with-
drawn from the market, probably due in part due to the lawsuit, but
also due to generic competition.134 One group-PharmaForce, Inc.-
requested that the FDA determine whether its withdrawal was due to
safety and efficacy reasons, and the FDA concluded it was not.' 35
The sole reason that courts have treated medical devices different-
ly from drugs in the preemption arena is that Congress provided an
express preemption clause in one regulatory regime and not the other.
131 Id. at 1202. These are not the only issues discussed in the case, but the
Supreme Court's treatment of the FDA's change in posture, now arguing that failure
to warn claims should be preempted after many years of having an anti-preemption
positions, and judicial deference to an agency's position, are not addressed herein as
ancillary to the points the authors wish to make.
132 See Press Announcement, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Requires
Boxed Warning for Promethazine Hydrochloride Injection (Sept. 16, 2009),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucml82498.htm.
133 See id.
134 Baxter Healthcare Corp. acquired the injection version of Phenergan in
2002 when it acquired ESI Lederle, a division of Wyeth. The injectable, tablet and
suppository forms of Phenergan have long been discontinued, although generic ver-
sions remain available. See Orange Book, searchable online at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfn.
135 Letter from Nikki Mueller, Office of Regulatory Policy, Center for Drug
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However, there is no reason to treat the two products differently. Both
types of medical product are highly regulated-indeed, the regulatory
regimes for drugs and Class III PMA devices are largely analogous.
Each requires a detailed approval application including copious safety
and efficacy data, as well as detailed manufacturing and packaging
specifications, including the proposed text and layout of the package
insert, which provides instructions for use of the drug or device.
For both types of medical products, highly technical medical is-
sues are at issue in the decision to approve the product and under what
conditions it should be used. Drugs and medical devices are not ordi-
nary consumer products. They act by changing the function of the
human body and can have dangerous side effects.13 6 Yet, they can also
reduce pain, improve function, and even save patients from an early
death.'3 7 The FDA employs or consults 38 with statisticians, epidemi-
ologists, toxicologists, medical generalists and specialists of all kinds
in making these risk-benefit evaluations.' 39 In each case the FDA
must balance the patient safety risks versus the health benefits for
each of the medical product's proposed uses.
The consumer interests are likewise the same in both instances-
consumers want to safeguard their health and safety and be able to
seek redress when accidents occur. Yet redress is curtailed only in
medical device cases. Presumably, combination products, which con-
tain both drugs and devices, would have to be decided on a case-by-
136 See Anita Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness and Efficacy Through
Personal Injury Litigation, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1051, 1075 (2007) ("The notion that
drugs lacking in safety cause injury and drugs lacking in efficacy do nothing fails to
reckon with the reason drugs are manufactured, prescribed, and ingested to alter the
body, pursuant to a determination that such an alteration is necessary to ameliorate or
prevent a pathological state.").
' See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979) ("Few if any
drugs are completely safe in the sense that they may be taken by all persons in all
circumstances without risk. Thus, the Commissioner generally considers a drug safe
when the expected therapeutic gain justifies the risk entailed by its use.").
38 In addition to FDA employees, the FDA makes extensive use of non-
employee Advisory Committees in making its risk benefit evaluations. See, e.g.,
Advisory Committees, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AdvisoryCommittees/default.htm (last updated 5/20/2011) (not-
ing that the FDA makes use of forty nine Advisory Committees and providing infor-
mation as to how the general public can join a committee).
19 See Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regula-
tion: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73, 91 (2008) ("[T]he
FDA exercises an authority that is probably more comprehensive and technocratically
rigorous than that exercised by any other federal regulator."); cf id. at 96 ("[T]his
political accountability of the FDA is in some tension with its expertise; politics may
sometimes override or compromise the technical judgments of the agency's profes-
sional staff, as in the case of the morning-after contraceptive pill.").
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case basis as to whether preemption should apply, but no rationale
exists for determining which plaintiffs should be shut out of court in
cases of medical injury involving combination drug-/medical devices.
For example, if a drug eluting stent causes injury, a court would have
no basis for deciding whether a failure to warn claim should be
preempted under the medical device preemption or allowed under
Wyeth v. Levine.
Additionally, one proclaimed benefit of litigation lies in its ability
to uncover evidence that would otherwise remain safely hidden in the
hands of the manufacturer. But this rationale applies equally to phar-
maceutical companies as to medical device companies. Indeed, in
many instances the same companies have both drug and device prod-
uct lines.
These facts seem to suggest that both types of products should be
treated the same-either preempted in both cases or not preempted in
either. In fact, there is pending legislation to equalize the playing field
by withdrawing preemption for federal medical device regulation.
Bills that were first introduced in July 2008140 to change the Riegel
outcome died, but similar bills were proposed again in 2010.141
However, under a comparative institutional analysis, the complex-
ity of the issues and the risk benefit balancing that is required suggests
that an agency staffed by technical and medical experts is the better
place for such issues to be decided. Agency control over package in-
serts would ensure that labels are consistent from state to state, plus an
agency can adequately consider the benefits of a drug or device in
deciding a warning label's content, and not just the associated risks as
is typical in the litigation setting. Thus, we posit that preemption
should be the rule in both instances, even if this limits plaintiff causes
of action.
Two prior FDA commissioners-Drs. Kennedy and Kessler-
submitted an amicus brief for the Wyeth case. The brief provided very
good arguments against preemption, particularly given the qualifica-
tions of the authors.142 Drs. Kennedy and Kessler noted that a strong
history of failure-to-warn cases in the pharmaceutical context, coupled
140 See Medical Device Safety Act of 2008, S. 3398, 110th Cong. (2008);
Medical Device Safety Act of 2008, H.R. 6381, 110th Cong. (2008).
141 See Medical Device Safety Act of 2009, S. 540, 110th Cong. (2009); Med-
ical Device Safety Act of 2009, H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing to amend
21 U.S.C. § 360k to provide that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to modi-
fy or otherwise affect any action for damages or the liability of any person under the
law of any State.").
142 Brief of Amici Curiae Former FDA Commissioners Dr. Donald Kennedy
and Dr. David A. Kessler in Support of Respondent at 6, Wyeth v. Levine, 944 A.2d
179 (Vt. 2006) (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Commissioners Brief].
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with Congressional failure to provide for preemption, should warn the
Court against finding implied preemption. 143 Further, petitioner's ar-
gument for preemption assumed that the FDA has timely access to
safety information, and that its capacity and resources to monitor safe-
ty information are equal to that of the drug's manufacturer.144 As not-
ed in the brief:
Neither of these myths is true today; neither was true when
Dr. Kennedy and Dr. Kessler headed FDA; and neither will be
true tomorrow. The simple fact is that drug companies have
far superior information-gathering tools about the safety pro-
file of the drugs they sell, while FDA's tools to keep track of
safety hazards post-approval are imperfect at best.145
It only made sense, they argued, to allow state failure-to-warn
cases, where petitioner's and FDA's claims of conflict were "not
based on hard evidence of actual conflict but instead rest only on pre-
dictive judgments unanchored to history."1 46
The ex-commissioners saw no conflict between FDA approval of
drug labeling and state tort failure-to-warn claims. According to the
brief, "failure-to-warn litigation does not challenge FDA's decisions
about labels; rather, it challenges a company's failure to alert physi-
cians and patients to risks that were unknown or poorly understood
when FDA approved the drug's label, but were evident to the compa-
ny at the time the plaintiff sustained injury. Litigation of that sort
complements, not undercuts, FDA's job of protecting consumers from
143 Id. at 6.
'" Id. at 20.
145 Id. at 5-6; see also Donald Kennedy, Misbegotten Preemptions, 320
SCIENCE 585, 585 (2008) (arguing that preemption could be dangerous to public
health because the FDA is badly underfunded, and because the FDA cannot guarantee
safety when approval trials include only a few hundred to a thousand patients, and
concluding: "In view of these deficiencies, how can one seriously defend a no-
liability clause to protect the manufacturer? In short, if you can't sue the maker of a
product, you deserve some guarantee that it's safe. If the FDA can't provide that, why
should you and I find the courtroom door closed?"); cf Richard A. Epstein, The Case
for Preemption of State Laws in Drug Cases, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 54, 60
(2008) (arguing that Drs. Kessler and Vladeck are wrong in assuming that the under-
manned FDA will simply roll over and allow new treatments onto the market without
adequate safety testing and that instead FDA "insecurities translate into a systematic
reluctance to let many drugs on the market, lest the agency has to pay a political price
if something goes wrong. That cautious form of institutional protection translates into
ever longer clinical trials and administrative delays. All in all, the real world risk is
that too few drugs reach the market, not too many.").
146 Commissioners Brief, supra note 142, at 6.
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dangerous drugs." 4 7 Further, a drug company can discharge its duty
to warn through other means, including, for example, "Dear Doctor"
letters, advertising and promotional materials, and other communica-
tions with doctors and patients.
It is hard to see, however, how a jury determination that IV push
should have been prohibited can be reconciled with the FDA's subse-
quent decision to allow the use. The FDA, indeed the entire pharma-
ceutical industry, is well aware of the Wyeth case and knows that the
jury decided that the IV push warnings were inadequate. Yet, again
the FDA declined to prohibit IV push, with full knowledge of the risks
of gangrene on accidental interarterial injection. Therefore, the FDA
at least implicitly disagrees with the jury's determination in the Wyeth
case.
If the record had contained sufficient evidence that the FDA con-
sidered and rejected an IV push contradiction, the failure to warn
claim might have been preempted because the state-required label
would "actually conflict" with the FDA-required label. 148 Indeed,
some commentators predict that companies will now try to avoid the
Wyeth outcome with additional papering of the record.14 9 Thus, the
drug approval process may become even more costly, as drug compa-
nies document each discussion with the FDA in exacting detail so that
a sufficient record is available to prove actual conflict between the
FDA labeling decision and the asserted failure to warn claim.
147 Id. at 5; cf Kim, supra note 3, at 403 ("Any requirement imposed by state
tort law to warn of a danger that FDA has concluded is not scientifically substantiated
would create an impermissible conflict for a manufacturer, since including the
warning would render the product misbranded under the FDCA and subject the manu-
facturer to potential civil and criminal liability, while failure to include it could lead
to tort liability. In other words, 'manufacturers are put to the Hobson's choice of
incurring sanctions irrespective of the requirement they follow."') (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
148 See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 866 (2000) (hold-
ing "that this kind of 'no airbag' lawsuit conflicts with the objectives of FMVSS 208,
a standard authorized by the Act, and is therefore pre-empted by the Act.").
149 See Val Jones, Wyeth vs. Levine: FDA Labeling Overuled by Jury of Lay
People, BETTER HEALTH (Mar. 4, 2009), http://getbetterhealth.com/wyeth-vs-levine-
fda-labeling-overuled-by-jury-of-lay-people/2009.03.04 (Bert Rein, attorney for
Wyeth, predicts that drug companies will react to the no preemption decision by
attempting to obtain "clear records" from the FDA on every drug label controversy
going forward and obtaining all FDA labeling decisions in writing, adding to the cost
and delays); see also David C. Vladeck, The FDA And Deference Lost: A Self-
Inflicted Wound Or The Product Of A Wounded Agency? A Response To Professor
O'Reilly, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 981, 999 (2008) (critiquing the FDA as ill equipped,
weakened from within, and neither transparent nor publicly accountable, but agreeing
that "in the long run, probing judicial review will impede the Agency's ability to do
its work swiftly and efficiently.").
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Dr. Kessler elaborates his argument, in a law review article pub-
lished in 2008, noting correctly that the agency only recently began to
espouse a pro-preemption viewpoint, and that the agency was wrong
to focus on the moment of approval as determinative." 0 Indeed, at the
moment of approval, the agency is in the best position to balance the
risks and benefits and decide on an appropriate label. But, argues Dr.
Kessler, "[t]he relevant timeframe is post-approval."' 51 Once a drug
enters the market, even relatively rare risks begin to emerge, and FDA
tools for gathering post-approval information are "relatively crude and
often ineffective." 
15 2
Further, the author noted examples where litigation has uncovered
adverse event data that was unknown by the agency, including the
selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors or "SSRI" class of drug.'15 In
one SSRI case, New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer
brought suit against the sponsor of Paxil@, presenting evidence that
the sponsor had suppressed the results of studies on children and ado-
lescents that showed Paxil@ to be ineffective and to increase the risk
of suicidal thinking and behavior.1 54 Further, an internal memo was
discovered stating that the sponsor intended to "manage the dissemi-
nation of the[] data in order to minimize any potential negative com-
mercial impact."155 In response to growing media attention and regu-
latory action by the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal
Products, 15 6 the FDA eventually decided to require a black box warn-
ing of increased suicide risk in children and adolescents. 57
150 David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the
FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to- Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 464-65 (2008).
' 5 Id. at 466.
152 Id.; see also Gregory D. Curfman, et al., Why Doctors Should Worry about
Preemption, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED 1, 2 (2008) ("Although frivolous lawsuits should
not be condoned, product-liability litigation has unquestionably helped to remove
unsafe products from the market and to prevent others from entering it. Through the
process of legal discovery, litigation may also uncover information about drug toxici-
ty that would otherwise not be known. Preemption will thus result in drugs and devic-
es that are less safe and will thereby undermine a national effort to improve patient
safety. Despite the diligent attention of the FDA, serious safety issues often come to
light only after a drug has entered the market. The FDA, which-unlike most other
federal agencies-has no subpoena power, knows only what manufacturers choose to
reveal.").
1 Kessler & Vladeck, supra note 150, at 493.
154 Bruce Levine, Behind the Paxil Scandals, Z MAG., Apr. 2005, at 11.
1 Wayne Kondro & Barbara Sibbald, Drug Company Experts Advised Staff
to Withhold Data about SSRI Use in Children, 170 CANADIAN MED. Ass'N. 783, 783
(2004).
156 Jeremy Laurance, Seroxat Controversy Deepens with Europe-wide Warn-
ing on Suicide, THE INDEPENDENT (July 26, 2004), http://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/health-and-families/health-news/seroxat-controversy-deepens-with-europewide-
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However, such examples can be less compelling in hindsight.
SSRI's, for example, appear to have a protective effect in adults, and
the data in children and adolescents are difficult to interpret due to
differences in coding between various trials, low numbers of young
patients, and the fact that the adverse event-suicide-is one of the
same outcomes as untreated depression. This makes it difficult to
ascertain the cause in any given suicide.
In fact, in 2008, the World Health Organization (WHO) recom-
mended SSRI use in children to treat depression and anxiety disor-
ders with close monitoring," 8 and has concluded that SSRls reduce
the overall risk of suicide. 159 Further, evidence suggests that treatment
of childhood depression with these drugs has decreased since the
waming-on-suicide-554456.html ("A new warning that the controversial antidepres-
sant Seroxat [aka Paxil, an SSRI] may increase the risk of suicide in young adults up
to the age of 30 is to be issued throughout Europe.").
157 Press Announcement, U.S. Food and Drug Admin., FDA Launches a
Multi-Pronged Strategy to Strengthen Safeguards for Children Treated with Antide-
pressant Medications (Oct. 15, 2004),
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2004/ucml08363.
htm.
1ss WHO, Second Meeting of the Subcommittee of the Expert Committee on
the Selection and Use of Essential Medicines: WHO Essential Drugs For Common
Psychiatric Disorders In Children (Sept. 29 - Oct. 3, 2008),
http://www.who.int/entity/selection medicines/committees/subcommittee/2/Psychoth
eraputicreview.pdf ("SSRIs are the medications of choice in treating childhood
anxiety disorders. They are well tolerated with mild transient side effects. Controlled
trials have established the safety and efficacy of SSRI's for childhood anxiety disor-
ders. Fluoxetine, Fluvoxamine and Sertraline have been shown to be more effective
than Placebo in RCT's. As anxiety disorders often coexist with depression, children
prescribed SSRI's for both conditions should be monitored closely for increased
suicidal thoughts and behaviour. . . SSRIs: Fluoxetine is the only medication which
has proven efficacy in clinical trials for treating depressive illness in children and
adolescents. Other SSRI's have shown small differences between the drug and place-
bo. Caution: SSRI's are associated with an increased risk of suicidal thoughts and
behaviour in the early phases of treatment. There have been no reports of completed
suicides attributed to treatment with SSRI's. Children need careful monitoring with
regular reviews during the early phases of treatment. Overall the use of SSRI's has
decreased suicide rates in children and adolescents.") (emphasis added).
15 Jeffrey A. Bridge et al., Clinical Response and Risk for Reported Suicidal
Ideation and Suicide Attempts in Pediatric Antidepressant Treatment: A Meta-
analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 297 JAMA 1683, 1683 (2007) ("Relative
to placebo, antidepressants are efficacious for pediatric MDD, OCD, and non-OCD
anxiety disorders, although the effects are strongest in non-OCD anxiety disorders,
intermediate in OCD, and more modest in MDD. Benefits of antidepressants appear
to be much greater than risks from suicidal ideation/suicide attempt across indica-
tions, although comparison of benefit to risk varies as a function of indication, age,
chronicity, and study conditions.") (emphasis added).
586 [ ol. 21:555
2011] FDA PREEMPTION OF DRUG AND DEVICE LABELING
black box warnings,16 0 and that suicides have increased at the same
time. 161
This example illustrates the consequences of over-warning and
the failure to treat serious medical problems.' 62 The preemption deci-
sions are premised on the false assumption that, while the FDA ap-
plies a floor to warning labels, tort law should be permitted to raise
the ceiling on labels because increasing the strength of a warning can-
not hurt individuals. But the SSRI example indicates that over-
warning is a real phenomenon and it affects more than Big Pharma's
bottom line. As noted by Dr. Thomas Laughren, Director of the Divi-
sion of Psychiatry Products at the FDA's Center for Drug Evaluation
and Research:
We put a black box on antidepressants for adolescents, but it
did have an impact on prescribing and there's been a lot of
negative feedback from the clinical community. It's important
to recognize that something as dramatic as a black box can
have a dramatic effect on prescribing.'63
Not only is over-warning a real threat, but litigation is naturally
biased towards false positives or an unbalanced result. In other words,
when the plaintiff prevails there is a significant possibility that the
drug manufacturer will thereby either increase warnings or remove the
drug from the market. In contrast, litigation has no effect on a drug or
160 Charles B. Nemeroff et al., Impact of Publicity Concerning Pediatric
Suicidality Data on Physician Practice Patterns in the United States, 64 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 466,466 (2007) ("The analyses suggest that the number of children
and teenagers who were prescribed antidepressants has decreased significantly (P =
.02) in the wake of widespread publicity surrounding the FDA public health adviso-
ries.").
161 Brady E. Hamilton et al., Annual Summary of Vital Statistics: 2005., 119
PEDIATRICS 345, 345 (2007) ("The death rates increased for intentional self-harm
(suicide), whereas rates for other causes did not change significantly for children.")
(emphasis added).
162 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner at 17, Wyeth v. Levine, 552 U.S. 1161 (2008) (No. 06-1249) ("'Exaggeration
of risk could discourage appropriate use of a beneficial drug,' and thereby harm the
public health. In addition, excessive warnings can cause more meaningfil risk infor-
mation to 'lose its significance."' (quoting 71 Fed. Reg. 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006)).
163 ADHD Drugs: Controversy over the "Black Box" Warning, DRUGS.COM,
http://www.drugs.com/news/adhd-controversy-over-black-box-warning- I 734.html
(last visited Sept. 22, 2010); Black Box Warnings Have Hampered Eczema Therapy,
HEMONC TODAY, http://www.hemonctoday.com/article.aspx?rid=35581 (last visited
Sept. 22, 2010) (statement of Dr. Ilene L. Rothman) ("[T]he black box warning has
brought about a marked unwillingness among both physicians and patients to use this
valuable addition [Protopic ointment and Elidel cream] to treatment options for atopic
dermatitis, a difficult disorder .... ).
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its labeling where the defendant prevails. Further, litigation can never
correct overzealous regulatory action that prevents drugs from ever
reaching the market in the first place.'6
One example of overcorrection is the drug Bendectin. Bendectin
is a mixture of pyridoxine (Vitamin B6) and doxylamine 1-an anti-
histamine that also has sedative effects and is the sedative ingredient
in NyQuil.166 It was prescribed to treat nausea and vomiting associat-
ed with morning sickness, but was voluntarily removed from the mar-
ket in 1983 following numerous lawsuits alleging that it caused birth
defects. Most of the evidence suggested that the drug was safe and
that the incidence of birth defects for women taking the drug was no
higher than for women who did not take the drug. However, some
accused the manufacturer of funding research to create favorable evi-
dence.167 Although the manufacturer won many cases, litigation costs
convinced it to remove the drug from the U.S. market. Nonetheless,
the drug remains available in Canada and Europe, and most evidence
over the following two decades confirms that Bendectin's withdrawal
from the U.S. market has not reduced the incidence of birth defects in
America, although the number of hospitalizations for women having
severe nausea and fluid loss has doubled.'69 Thus, Benedictin seems
to provide another example of overcorrection, resulting in an increase
in overall harm.
16 Epstein, supra note 145, at 60 ("Where the FDA incorrectly blocks a drug
from entering the market, litigation can do nothing to correct that error.").
165 Raafat Bishai et al., Critical Appraisal of Drug Therapy for Nausea and
Vomiting of Pregnancy: 11. Efficacy and Safety of Diclectin (Doxylamine-B6), 7 CAN.
J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY, 138, 139 (2000).
166 See NyQuil label (on file with author).
167 Christina Marie Martin, Hugs And Drugs: Research Ethics, Conflict of
Interest, And Why the FDA's Attempt to Preempt Pharma Failure-To-Warn Claims is
a Dangerous Prescription, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 587, 618-19 (2008) (arguing that
Bendectin's manufacturer "was able to create and influence a scientific subdiscipline
devoted to result-driven studies that [it] could then cite to defeat lawsuits brought by
those who alleged that their birth defects were caused by Merrell Dow's Bendectin. In
light of such a powerful declaration, the Bendectin litigation should no longer serve as
evidence that trial courts cannot justly rule in pharma products liability suits.") (cita-
tion omitted).
168 Alex Kozinski, Brave New World, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 997, 1006
(1997) ("Due to the litigation, Bendectin was taken off the U.S. market because the
manufacturer decided it just was not worth it.").
169 Jeffrey S. Kutcher et al., Bendectin and Birth Defects. II: Ecological Anal-
yses, 67 BIRTH DEFECTS RES. 88, 88 (2003) ("The temporal trends in prevalence rates
for specific birth defects examined from 1970 through 1992 did not show changes
that reflected the cessation of Bendectin use over the 1980-84 period. Further, the
[nausea and vomiting of pregnancy] hospitalization rate doubled when Bendectin use
ceased.").
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Further, although some argue that litigation is corrective, in fact
much litigation merely follows on agency corrections and contributes
nothing to safety.170 Anita Bernstein argues that "not since the litiga-
tion-hastened demise of the very dangerous Dalkon Shield intrauterine
device in 1974 has any pharmaceutical product demonstrated that
personal-injury liability can be a source of social utility.""' Perhaps
we should not concede that pharmaceutical tort litigation improves the
public health until better evidence is available.172
Commissioners Kennedy and Kessler do make a very good point
that FDA information gathering tools are limited and that litigation
can supplement safety information about drugs. However, recent
amendments to the FDCA take significant steps to provide both the
public and the FDA with additional safety information and reduce the
power of their argument. Section 801 of the Food and Drug Admin-
istration Amendments Act of 2007 (the FDAAA) increases the infor-
mation that must be published by sponsors at ClinicalTrials.gov-a
database established and maintained by the National Institutes of
Health (NIH) for the reporting of clinical trials. 173 The FDAAA ex-
panded clinical trial registration to all Phase IlI-IV clinical trials and
170 See Bernstein, supra note 136, at 1055 ("Take Vioxx as exemplar of what
personal-injury liability has not achieved. Plaintiffs' lawyers did not discover its
dangers; the drug had already left the market before a jury verdict came in against it;
increases in talk about improving drug safety policy also had predated liability for this
drug; and personal-injury litigation did not generate information to benefit the con-
suming public."); Epstein, supra note 145, at 60-61 ("The drugs that usually generate
the most litigation- such as Rezulin and Vioxx- usually are withdrawn before litiga-
tion commences. Indeed the plaintiffs' bar rightly free rides on FDA determinations,
reducing the social gain from litigation."); Paul Howard & Marie Gryphon, Manhat-
tan Moment: The Right Prescription for Drug Safety, WASH. EXAMINER, Dec. 4,
2008, available at
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/Manhattan Moment Theright prescri
ption for-drug safety_120408.html ("The FDA is famously imperfect. But it does
not follow that interference from tort lawyers will do more good than harm when it
comes to drug safety and labeling practices. Plaintiffs' lawyers receive contingency
fees of 33% or more. This is a powerful incentive to press any colorable claim, even
those involving drugs that unquestionably do more good than harm.").
'1 Bernstein, supra note 136, at 1055.
172 James M. Beck & Mark Herrmann, Does Tort Litigation Improve Drug
Safety?, DRUG AND DEVICE LAW (Oct. 27, 2008, 7:59 AM)
http://druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2008/10/does-tort-litigation-improve-
drug.html ("Until the empirical data exist, defendants should not concede that phar-
maceutical tort litigation improves the public health. What little we've found on the
subject suggests that it does not."). The authors are aware that the evidence on either
side of the question is less than rigorous.
'7 See, e.g., About ClinicalTrials.gov, CLINICALTRIALS.GOV,
http://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/info/about (last updated Apr. 2, 2008).
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expanded the information that must be reported to include final re-
sults.174
Trials must be registered at Clinical.Trials.gov within twenty-one
days of enrolling the first patient, 17 5 and results must be posted within
one year of the earlier of the estimated completion date or the actual
completion date, unless the manufacturer is in the process of submit-
ting a new drug application (NDA) or new use application.176 The
"completion date" is defined as the date that the "final subject was
examined or received an intervention for the purposes of final collec-
tion of data for the primary outcome" and thus, does not include anal-
ysis time or patient care relating to secondary outcomes.' 77 Further,
since the completion date relates to last patient care date, rather than
completion of the analysis, the FDAAA applies even to drug trials that
are discontinued.
Most harmful data is probably collected in discontinued trials, and
indeed is a significant factor in the decision to discontinue a trial. Fur-
ther, there is a natural scientific tendency to be less interested in pub-
lishing negative results. In the drug safety context, however, such data
is essential to evaluate accurately the risks and benefits of a drug. 7 8
If the sponsor intends to file an NDA or new use application and
files a certification to that effect, posting can be delayed, but results
must still be posted within thirty days of approval or rejection, within
120 days of withdrawal without resubmission, or within two years of
174 The FDAAA also gave expanded FDA authority for the postmarket safety
of drugs, including the power to require postmarketing studies, to order changes in a
drug's label and to restrict distribution of a drug. Food and Drug Administration
Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 901(a), 121 Stat. 823, 922-26
(2007).
1 See § 801(a)(j)(2)(C), 121 Stat. at 907.
171 § 801(a)(j)(3)(E), 121 Stat. at 912-13. The Secretary may increase this to
eighteen months. § 801(a)(j)(3)(D)(iv)(I), 121 Stat. at 911.
177 § 801(a)6)(1)(A)(v), Stat. at 905.
178 Howard A. Denemark, Improving Litigation Against Drug Manufacturers
for Failure to Warn Against Possible Side Effects: Keeping Dubious Lawsuits from
Driving Good Drugs Off the Market, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 413, 437 (1990) ("It is
quite common in epidemiology for the first published studies of an association to
suggest a positive association, with subsequent reports being negative; . . . . The rea-
son for this is fairly obvious. Investigators are more likely to write up positive find-
ings, reviewers to consider them of interest, editors to publish them, and the press to
publicize them. It is only after the initial observation is published that investigators
who have negative data feel obliged to report them.") (quoting Michael B. Bracken,
Spermicidal Contraceptives and Poor Reproductive Outcomes: The Epidemiologic
Evidence Against an Association, 151 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 552, 555
(1985)).
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the certification date if none of these actions have occurred.179 Thus,
all safety data should eventually become available.
The type of information to be reported includes descriptive infor-
mation regarding study design, recruitment, contact and administra-
tive information. 80 Further, the Act directs the NIH to expand the
database to include the "results" of applicable clinical trials.' 8 ' Basic
results are to include demographic and baseline data, as well primary
and secondary outcome measures.182 An expanded results registry is
to be available not later than three years after the Act [i.e., September
2010] and is to include both technical and non-technical summaries of
the clinical trial, the full protocol and such other categories as deemed
appropriate.183 More importantly, updates are required not less than
once every twelve months, and recruitment status updates and com-
pletion updates are required with thirty days of such status change.184
Sponsors are also to submit tables of adverse events, including fre-
quent (>5%) adverse events.
Once the expanded results database is available, preemption of
state regulations is provided.186 Although the database updates and
implementing regulations are not yet completed, the FDA has indicat-
ed that it expects adverse events reporting to begin on September 27,
2009. Thus, both the public and the FDA will have increased access to
safety data an ongoing basis.
In addition to the publication requirements, the FDAAA also gave
the FDA the power to require Phase IV studies and to order label
changes.187 The FDAAA also requires a summary analysis of the ad-
verse drug reaction reports received for the drug, including identifica-
tion of any new risks not previously identified, potential new risks, or
known risks reported in unusual number. This analysis must be sub-
mitted within eighteen months after the approval of an NDA or after
10,000 individuals use the drug, whichever is later.'88 These changes
close a significant gap in FDA authority and give the FDA additional
179 § 801(a)(j)(3)(E)(iii-v), 121 Stat. at 913-14.
180 § 801(a)(j)(2)(A)(ii), 121 Stat. at 905.
181 § 801(a)()(2)(A)(i), 121 Stat. at 906.
182 § 801(a)(j)(2)(C), 121 Stat. at 909-10.
183 § 801(a)(j)(2)(D), 121 Stat. at 910-11.
184 § 801(a)j)(4)(C)(i), 121 Stat. at 916-17.
181 § 801(a)(j)(3)(H)(I)(iii), 121 Stat. at 915.
§ 801(d)(1), 121 Stat. at 922 ("Upon the expansion of the registry and
results data bank . .. no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or con-
tinue in effect any requirement for the registration of clinical trials or for the inclusion
of information relating to the results of clinical trials in a database.").
187 § 901(a)(o)(3-4), 121 Stat. at 923-24.
" §915, 121 Stat. at 957-58.
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enforcement tools. Thus, much of the force of Drs. Kennedy and
Kessler's lack of FDA information gathering ability argument is di-
minished by the new publication requirements and the additional
powers granted to the FDA.
Although FDA resources will always be constrained, the FDA is
not the only watchdog monitoring the pharmaceutical and medical
device industries. Several watchdog groups supplement the agency's
enforcement activities." 9 Such groups provide public education on
drug safety, 190 and file both lawsuits and citizens' petitions at the
FDA to improve drug safety and change drug labels.19' Thus, the
FDA's meager enforcement resources are supplemented by a variety
of drug safety watchdog groups.
Even with insufficient resources and in the face of significant crit-
icism, the available evidence suggests that FDA enforcement activity
has increased recently.192 According to studies, the FDA issued device
189 See, e.g., CENTER FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
http://www.cspinet.org/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010); HEALTHY SKEPTICISM,
http://www.healthyscepticism.org/global/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010); MARKETING
OVERDOSE, http://www.marketingoverdose.org/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010);
PHARMEDOUT, http://www.pharmedout.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2010);
PRESCRIPTION ACCESS LITIGATION, http://www.prescriptionaccess.org/ (last visited
Sept. 22, 2010); Pushing Prescriptions, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY: PUSHING
PRESCRIPTIONS, http://www.publicintegrity.org/projects/entry/289/try (last visited
Sept. 22, 2010); KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/ (last
visited Sept. 22, 2010); THE PRESCRIPTION PROJECT,
http://www.prescriptionproject.org/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010); THE US DRUG
WATCHDOG, http://usdrugwatchdog.com/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010); PUBLIC
CITIZEN, http://www.citizen.org/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2010).
190 See, e.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN, http://www.worstpills.org (last visited Nov. 9,
2010). Worstpills.org is a searchable, online drug database that provides comprehen-
sive information about prescription drugs and warns of drugs that are unsafe or inef-
fective.
191 See, e.g., Petition from Sidney M. Wolfe et al., Dir., Public Citizen Health
Research Group, to Andrew von Eschenback, Comm'r, U.S. Food and Drug Admin.,
(Jan. 23, 2008), available at http://www.citizen.org/hrgl834 (petitioning for regulato-
ry action concerning the spread of botulinum toxin to other parts of the body); see
also Bayer Sued Over Unsupported Prostate Cancer Claims on One A Day, CENTER
FOR SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, http://www.cspinet.org/new/200910011.html
(last visited Sept. 22, 2010) (suing Bayer for falsely claiming that the selenium in its
multivitamins might reduce the risk of prostate cancer).
192 John B. Reiss et al., Your Business in Court 2008-2009, 64 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 755, 755, 757 (2009) ("Throughout 2008 and 2009, FDA increased both the
number and the severity of its enforcement actions. FDA issued device recalls and
waming/untitled letters in record numbers. According to Becker Consulting, 845
medical device recalls were announced in 2008, representing a 43 percent increase
over the previous year's medical device recalls. Similarly within the first quarter of
2009, FDA's Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communication
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recalls, warning letters and untitled letters in record numbers in 2008-
2009, including a 43 percent increase over the previous year's medical
device recalls. Indeed, as many warning or untitled letters were issued
in first quarter of 2009 as in nearly all of the past three years com-
bined. These results suggest that the FDA is addressing some of the
criticisms previously leveled against it.193
Another argument against preemption arises from the issue of re-
dress. If preemption is to be the rule, plaintiffs arguably lack any re-
course for serious injuries. As noted by former FDA Commissioner
Donald Kennedy "if you can't sue the maker of a product, you de-
serve some guarantee that it's safe. If the FDA can't provide that, why
should you and I find the courtroom door closed?"1 94
Yet, that view point is overly simplistic, and the courtroom doors
would not necessarily be barred. For example, cigarette labels have
long been prescribed by the federal government, which also provided
a preemption clause against additional state labeling requirements.
Yet, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. plaintiffs litigating the
preemption issue for tobacco labeling were not denied breach of ex-
press warranty, fraud, or conspiracy to conceal material facts
claims.195 Such claims would be appropriate for the pharmaceutical
company with misleading direct-to-consumer advertising or who
failed to timely bring important safety data to the FDA's attention.196
Many cases have held that there is no private right of action to en-
force the FDCA under 21 U.S.C. § 337.117 While this is a generally
(DDMAC) published as many warning/untitled letters as in nearly all of the past three
years." (citations omitted)).
193 E.g., DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, CHANGING THE FUTURE OF
DRUG SAFETY: FDA INITIATIVES TO STRENGTHEN AND TRANSFORM THE DRUG SAFETY
SYSTEM (2009) (outlining the status of FDA efforts to address criticisms), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Safety/SafetyofSpecificProducts/UCM1 84046.pdf.
194 Donald Kennedy, Misbegotten Preemptions, 320 SCIENCE 585, 585
(2008).
'9s 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
196 Id. at 515, 530-31 (holding that a tobacco preemption clause that read
"[njo requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under
State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages
of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act" preempted state
failure-to-warn claims, but not breach of express warranty, fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion, or conspiracy to conceal material fact). (emphasis added) (citation omitted); cf
Buckman v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) (barring stand-alone
fraud-on-the-FDA claims involving a regulated medical device as impliedly preempt-
ed).
' See, e.g., Loreto v. Procter & Gamble Co., 737 F.Supp. 2d 909 (S.D. Ohio
2010) (holding no private right of action under the FDCA); see also 21 U.S.C. § 337
(2006) ("[A]ll such proceedings for the enforcement, or to restrain violations, of this
[Act] shall be by and in the name of the United States.").
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true statement, the Supreme Court has only noted that there is no fed-
eral cause of action for violation of the FDCA.198 However, that does
not mean there are no state law causes of action that may relate to
FDCA violations. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Medtronic v. Lohr
expressly stated that parallel claims would not be preempted in the
medical device context:
Nothing in §360k [related to 510(k) clearance for medical de-
vices] denies Florida the right to provide a traditional damag-
es remedy for violations of common law duties when those
duties parallel federal requirements. Even if it may be neces-
sary as a matter of Florida law to prove that those violations
were the result of negligent conduct, or that they created an
unreasonable hazard for users of the product, such additional
elements of the state law cause of action would make the state
requirements narrower, not broader, than the federal require-
ment. While such a narrower requirement might be "different
from" the federal rules in a literal sense, such a difference
would surely provide a strange reason for finding pre-emption
of a state rule insofar as it duplicates the federal rule. The
presence of a damages remedy does not amount to the addi-
tional or different "requirement" that is necessary under the
statute; rather, it merely provides another reason for manufac-
turers to comply with identical existing "requirements" under
federal law.199
Thus, under Cipollone and Medtronic v. Lohr, a variety of claims
could remain available for the injured plaintiff.200 Further, in both the
198 Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810
(1986) ("[B]oth parties agree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that there is no
federal cause of action for FDCA violations. For purposes of our decision, we assume
that this is a correct interpretation of the FDCA.").
19 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495 (1996) ("Nothing in § 360k
[relating to 510(k) medical devices] denies Florida the right to provide a traditional
damages remedy for violations of common-law duties when those duties parallel
federal requirements.").
200 See e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prod. Liab. Litig., 159 F.3d 817,
823 (3d Cir. 1998) (allowing a common law fraudulent misrepresentation claim based
on Lohr because the "state common law relied upon does not impose any obligation .
. . inconsistent with federal law."); Femrite v. Abbott Nw. Hosp., 568 N.W.2d 535,
539 n.4 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) ("21 U.S.C. § 337(a) only bars actions to 'enforce' the
FDCA . . . . [A]ppellants' action alleging that Abbott was negligent because it failed
to comply with FDA regulations is not an action to enforce the FDCA. The FDCA
regulates the marketing of medical devices, not the practice of medicine."); Hofts v.
Howmedica Osteonics Corp., 597 F.Supp.2d 830, 832-33 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (holding
that plaintiff "may pursue civil claims against Howmedica based on theories that
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Wyeth and the Riegel cases, as in many such cases, both plaintiffs also
had claims against the medical practitioners, each of whom used the
medical product improperly and in a way specifically warned against
on the respective instructions for use.201
Additionally, Congress could craft a preemption clause that is nar-
rowly tailored to prevent litigants from disputing the content of pack-
age inserts without foreclosing other causes of action. For example,
direct-to-consumer advertising is far less controlled by the FDA than
package inserts, and deceptive or misleading advertising should still
be litigable because the same balancing of risks and benefits issues are
less apparent on direct-to-consumer advertising which never contain
the full range of package insert warnings. Likewise, the preemption
clause can provide an express exception clause, allowing litigation to
proceed where there was actual concealment or delay in reporting
damaging data or provision of misleading or fraudulent data to the
FDA, in a manner similar to the approach used in Texas and Michi-
gan.202
Howmedica failed to comply with federal requirements for manufacturing the re-
placement hip joint implanted in him.").
201 It is true that tort reform has in some cases placed limits on damages and
in certain states already provides for FDA preemptive effect. However, that is an
issue democratically decided on a state by state basis and although tort reform may
limit plaintiffs in some respects, it usually does not prevent all redress. See, e.g., TEX.
Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.007 (West 2010) ("[T]here is a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the defendant or defendants . . . are not liable with respect to the allega-
tions involving failure to provide adequate warnings or information if: (1) the warn-
ings or information that accompanied the product in its distribution were those ap-
proved by the [FDA]"). The Texas statute also provides that the presumption can be
rebutted if the defendant withholds or misrepresents material information to the FDA,
if an off-label use was promoted, or if the defendant violated the statute, among other
things.
202 See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. Code ANN. § 82.007 (West 2010) ("[T]here
is a rebuttable presumption that the defendant or defendants . . . are not liable with
respect to the allegations involving failure to provide adequate warnings or infor-
mation if: (1) the warnings or information that accompanied the product in its distri-
bution were those approved by the [FDA][.] (b) The claimant may rebut the presump-
tion ... by establishing that: (1) the defendant ... withheld from or misrepresented. .
. required information . . . that was material and relevant to the performance of the
product and was causally related to the claimant's injury[.]"); see also MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 600.2946(5) (West 2010) ("[A] drug is not defective or unreasonably
dangerous, and the manufacturer or seller is not liable, if the drug was approved for
safety and efficacy . . . and the drug and its labeling were in compliance with the
[FDA's] approval . . . This subsection does not apply if the defendant . . .
[i]ntentionally withholds from or misrepresents ... information concerning the drug .
. . and the drug would not have been approved ... if the information were accurately
submitted.").
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Some might argue that such an exception would merely shift early
litigation efforts toward the discovery of evidence that the manufac-
turer withheld, delayed, or misrepresented the significance of negative
data, and thus the industry would be no better off.20 3 However, our
aim herein is not to protect the industry from litigation, but to retain
the FDA's careful balancing of risks and benefits in approving the
package inserts and prevent the over-warning or state-by-state varia-
bility that may result when juries decide failure-to-warn cases. 20 4
Thus, a carefully crafted preemption clause, with express exceptions
for fraud, misrepresentation and delay, would retain the information
uncovering and issue redress benefits of litigation, without allowing a
jury to interfere with the careful risk benefit evaluations undergone by
the FDA in deciding what the package insert should say.
CONCLUSION
In concluding, we emphasize that we do not consider Wyeth v.
Levine to be incorrectly decided on a legal basis, although we might
have disagreed with lower courts findings of fact.205 There was no
203 See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 139, at 105-06 (arguing for a higher standard
to access the preemption exceptions and stating: "A danger exists, however, with
respect to all of these exceptions. Under the modem system of notice pleading, it is all
too easy to allege fraud, non-fraudulent misrepresentation, or non-disclosure of mate-
rial facts-and indeed all of them simultaneously. Unless the rules for pleading these
torts are more demanding than usual, a plaintiff can defeat one of the principal pur-
poses of preemption-avoiding costly litigation under state law in situations in which
uniform federal law should apply-simply by alleging fraudulent or non-fraudulent
misrepresentation or non-disclosure.").
204 See id at 110 ("[S]tate variation and experimentation, often a virtue in
other areas, is decidedly unwelcome in the particular context of comprehensive FDA
drug regulation.").
205 E.g., there was no evidence that there was anything "new" with regards to
the risks of IV push. Thus, the CBE provision arguably did not apply and Wyeth
could not have changed the label unilaterally. Cf Timothy Ardizzone, The FDA:
Advocate Or Regulator Of The Pharmaceutical Industry? The Attempted Preemption
By The FDA Of State Tort Claims For Failure To Warn On Pharmaceutical Labeling,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 763, 787 (2006) (noting that the Restatement (Third) of Torts
states that a drug manufacturer is liable for injuries caused by a drug marketed with-
out reasonable warnings regarding "'foreseeable risks of harm posed by [that] drug . .
. ."', but being willing to impose liability before the risk is validated, and stating "the
FDA appears to argue that a risk is not foreseeable for the purposes of tort liability
until the risk is scientifically validated. . . . Contrary to the FDA's argument for
preemption, the fact that some people are injured by a drug implies that there is a risk
to a fraction of the population of having an adverse event, which should prompt the
common law duty to warn." (footnote omitted)). Further, considering that the FDA
was well aware of the risks of IV push, yet didn't prohibit it, there was arguably an
actual conflict. Indeed, when the FDA revisited the warning label again after the
decision, they still did not prohibit IV push. According to the lower courts analysis, if
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express preemption provision in the statute,206 and there was a long
history of state regulation of public health and welfare, coupled with a
long history of state failure-to-warn claims against the pharmaceutical
industry.207 Thus, a presumption against preemption was correctly
applied. The Court found no actual conflict because the record was
insufficient to establish that the FDA considered and rejected an IV
push contraindication. There was no field preemption because the
FDA had long accepted state tort claims to be a valid means of com-
plementing FDA enforcement, and because the FDA only established
a floor, beyond which the warnings may not be reduced. Further, the
CBE regulation expressly allowed a drug sponsor to increase unilater-
ally the warnings and obtain FDA approval after the fact. Thus, state
failure-to-warn claims were not preempted.
However, we do suggest that there is insufficient justification for
treating medical devices and pharmaceuticals differently. Both should
be treated similarly. Further, although there is legislation to remove
device preemption, we suggest that the better approach might be to
provide a limited preemption for both types of medical products.
It is true that FDA resources are constrained and that litigation has
helped to uncover instances of withheld negative data and has resulted
in an increased use of warnings. However, litigation is a crude tool for
balancing the risks and benefits of a medical product. Indeed, in any
failure to warn case, no one represents the patient whose life is signif-
icantly improved by a particular medical product and thus there can
only be a bias towards over-warning. Further, the dangers of over-
warning are not merely theoretical. Over-warning discourages drug
the FDA again failed to document their decision making process, the next case could
come out the same way. Cf Leslie C. Kendrick, FDA 's Regulation of Prescription
Drug Labeling: A Role for Implied Preemption, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 227, 246
(2007) (noting that it is difficult to decide what the FDA's position is when they are
silent and stating "[i]t might be unclear from this silence whether FDA thought that
the need for a warning was unsubstantiated, or that a warning would be an overdeter-
rent, or that a warning would actually make a drug misbranded," and that "[i]f the
agency wants broad preemptive force for its determinations, it is within its power to
articulate those determinations explicitly. Thus implied preemption should not cover
instances of agency silence.").
206 Marilyn P. Westerfield, Comment, Federal Preemption And The FDA:
What Does Congress Want?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 263, 272 (1989) ("It is clear that the
courts are not willing to infer preemption of state law without something more from
Congress.").
207 Gregory J. Wartman, Life After Riegel: A Fresh Look at Medical Device
Preemption One Year After Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 291, 293
(2009) (noting that although health and safety have traditionally been areas of state
concern, that "[olver the last several decades, however, the federal government has
become 'increasingly' involved in the regulation of matters of health and safety.").
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use, and can leave patients without a viable treatment alternative, re-
sulting in an overall increase in public harm.
Furthermore, requiring all Phase II-IV trials to be published along
with summaries of adverse events will provide the FDA, the medical
community, and the public at large with much better information re-
garding the true safety and potential side effects of drugs, thus negat-
ing one of the proposed reasons for retaining the litigation safety
valve. The databases are not yet fully operational, and it will take
some time to collect and analyze enough data to realize the full poten-
tial of the new publication system. However, in a few years time we
should have access to safety data for discontinued trials within a short
time of their discontinuance, and it will be much more difficult to hide
or delay unfavorable data. At least at that time-if not today-we
believe that society should consider making the FDA the final arbitra-
tor of drug labels, and specifically call for preemption of failure-to-
warn claims relating to package inserts. Plaintiffs need not lose all
recourse and bad behavior can still be litigable under express excep-
tions to the preemption clause, such as fraud or misrepresentation of
data, or misleading direct-to-consumer advertising.
As Justice Breyer asked during the oral argument in Warner-
Lambert Co. v. Kent case, "[W]ho would you rather have make the
decision as to whether this drug is, on balance, going to save people
or, on balance, going to hurt people? An expert agency, on one hand,
or 12 people pulled randomly for a jury role who see before them only
the people whom the drug hurt and don't see the people who need the
drug to cure them?" 208 That is the question we must wrestle with, and
we would be wiser to consider both the benefits-as well as the
risks-in deciding our answer.
208 Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 552 U.S.
440 (2008) (No. 06-1498).
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